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1. See Mullineaux 
(1976, p.  277). 
2. See the succinct 
summary of William- 
son S  views and sup- 
porting empirical 
evidence in  Armour 
and Teece (1978). 
3.  It is also possible 
that the expected net 
benefits of consoli- 
dation are dependent 
on size and other 
characteristics of a 
particular MBHC. 
4.  In many of these 
states, MBHCs par- 
tially consolidated 
their subsidiaries. 
Such companies were 
not included in this 
study because of the 
heterogeneous nature 
oftheir  organiza- 
tional changes. 
5.  The states are 
New York, Florida, 
Ohio, New Jersey, 
Virginia, Alabama, 
and Tennessee. The 
number of companies 
drawn from each 
state is seven, three, 
three, one, foul: two, 
and one respectively. 





by Gary Whalen 
Many states have chosen to legally restrict 
intrastate branching by banks to some degree. 
In a large proportion of  such states, banks are 
able to circumvent the prohibition on state- 
wide branching because they are permitted to 
adopt a multibank holding company (MBHC) 
form and to acquire affiliate banks through- 
out the state. However, because subsidiary 
banks in a MBHC continue to be separately 
incorporated enti  ties, and because a number 
of  legal-regulatory impediments to full organi- 
zational integration exist, it has been argued 
that MBHCs are imperfect substitutes for 
branch banking systems? That is, MBHCs 
may be less able to exploit size-related econo- 
mies than pure branch banking organizations. 
On the other hand, researchers such as 
0.  Williamson have argued that it might be 
optimal for relatively large firms to operate as 
multi-divisional holding companies, rather 
than to merge all operating units into a single 
~ubsidiary.~ 
Beginning with New York in the mid-1970s, a 
number of  states have amended their branch- 
ing laws to permit MBHCs to transform their 
affiliates into branches by merging them into 
one large bank subsidiary (or several large 
ones). Interestingly, in states where such 
activity has been authorized, MBHCs have 
chosen to consolidate their subsidiary banks 
in varying degrees suggesting that the man- 
agement of  competing companies disagree about 
the expected net benefits of  consolidation or, 
alternatively, about the costs of  retaining the 
MBHC form.3 
No empirical evidence currently exists on 
the net benefits of  holding company consolida- 
tion. Such evidence could be of  value because 
legislation authorizing such activity is cur- 
rently being considered in several states. 
Measurement of  the impact of  total consoli- 
dation on the equity value of  the  consolidating 
MBHC is the subject of  this study.4 
In brief, the expected net benefits of  consoli- 
dation are inferred by examining the behavior 
of  the daily stock returns of  a sample of  21 
bank holding companies in seven states when 
the intention to merge their affiliates is first 
announ~ed.~  The behavior of  their stock returns 
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Best available copy6. See Fama et al. 
(1  969). 
Z For various appli- 
cations of  the event 
study technique, see 
any of  the various 
studies cited in the 
references. 
8. See the discussion 
in Eisenbeis et al. 
(1984, p. 893) and 
in Jain (1985, 
pp. 221-22). 
9.  There is somefrag- 
mentary survey evi- 
dence that suaests 
that the impact of con- 
solidation might be 
negative, particularly 
in the short run. 
There are several 
reasons this might be 
the case. Benefits of 
consolidation could 
be  long-term and/or 
non-pecuniary. For 
example, consolida- 
tion might permit the 
parent to limit sub- 
sidiary risk-taking. 
In addition, loss of 
subsidiary indepen- 
dence might lower 
morale and produc- 
tivity. See the discus- 
sion in the Associa- 
tion of Bank Holding 
Companies (1978, 
pp. 24-29). 
10.  Some responding 
MBHCs reported 
that organizational 
change was under- 
taken in response to 
financial difficulties. 
See Association of 
Bank Holding Com- 
panies (1978, p. 34). 
over some period containing the announcement 
date presumably reflects investor estimates 
of  the impact of  the organizational change on 
the future profitability and market value of 
the banking organization. The event-study 
framework first used by Fama et al. (1969) 
is employed! 
I. The Event Study Framework 
I 
In the event-study framework, the focus is on 
the observed behavior of a sample of  firms' 
stock market returns, actually the "abnormal" 
1  portion of  these returns, around the time at 
which some material development (the event) 
potentially affecting each firm's market value 
is initially made knowm7 "Abnormal returns" 
presumably reflect the capital market's esti- 
mate of  the expected net impact of  the devel- 
opment on the future profitability and market 
value of  the firm. Abnormal returns may be 
observed prior to the event either because of 
market anticipation or leakage of  information 
about the event. In an efficient market, only 
normal returns should be evident after the new 
relevant information is fully digested by mar- 
ket participants. However, if  the announcement 
represents a strategic management decision, 
it is possible that abnormal returns prior to the 
event may precipitate rather than reflect the 
impact of  the decision. The time pattern of 
the abnormal returns may suggest the direc- 
tion of  cau~ality.~ 
In this study, the critical event is each 
MBHC's first public announcement of  the 
intention to consolidate all of  its subsidiary 
banks and effectively transform itself into a 
branch banking organization. Positive abnor- 
mal returns around the event date suggest 
that the announced consolidation is expected 
to boost future profitability and to generate 
net benefits for holding company shareholders. 
The interpretation of  negative abnormal 
returns is more difficult. Such returns may 
indicate that investors expect the change to 
depress the holding company's market value? 
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Alternatively, because the decision to con- 
solidate is a strategic one, the announcement 
might be the result rather than the cause of 
the negative abnormal returnsJO  Again, the tim- 
ing of  the returns should suggest which one 
of  these interpretations is correct. In particular, 
negative abnormal returns very close to the 
announcement date suggest that the announce- 
ment is responsible for the negative returns, 
rather than the reverse. 
It should be noted that the  discovery of  signif- 
icant abnormal returns only provides insight 
on the  consolidation impacts expected by share- 
holders. The presence of  abnormal returns 
does not permit the analyst to unambiguously 
determine the effect of  consolidation on social 
welfare. For example, positive abnormal re- 
turns  could reflect either expected gains in effi- 
ciency due to consolidation or expected prof- 
itability increases due to consolidation-related 
changes in competition at the local level. In 
the latter case, the shareholders gain comes at 
the expense of  holding company customers. 
11.  Methodology 
The basic procedure used to calculate the 
abnormal returns for each company in this 
study is the same as that used in a large 
number of  previous event studies published 
to date. 
First, the event date for each company had 
to be determined. This date was defined to be 
the date on which a company's intention to 
consolidate was first reported in the financial 
press. These dates were discovered by search- 
ing the indexes of  three publications: The Wall 
Street  Journal,  The American Banker, and 
Funk and Scott's Index of  Cot$orations and 
Industries. Thus, announcement dates (AD), 
rather than effective dates, were used as  event 
dates. In efficient markets, investors presum- 
ably react around the time at which a material 
development is announced rather than when 
the announced action is taken, and so cause 
the firm's stock price and market value to 
adjust around announcement dates rather 
than effective dates. 
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mation periods were 
tried, but this did not 
change the reported 
results in any mate- 
rial way. 
12.  A number of 
researchers have 
found that there is 
a strong industy 
effect on the returns 
of bank stocks and 
have argued that this 
influence should 
be controlled for in 
event studies of  bank- 
ingfirms. See Eisen- 
beis et al. (1984, 
P. 883). Shick and 
Sherman (19801, 
and Keen (1983). 
13.  Alternative 
versions of  equation 
(2) were estimated 
using techniques sug- 
gested in Scholes 
and Williams (1977) 
and Dimson (1979) 
to correct for  statis- 
tical firoblems caused 
by infrequent secu- 
rities trading. In 
addition, standar- 
dized abnormal re- 
turns were generated 
using the technique 
reported in Linn and 
McConnell (1983). 
Neither of these two 
methods produced 
results different  from 
those reported and 
so are not presented. 
14.  The average 
Profiortion of the 
organization S total 
assets accounted for 
by the lead bank for 
these three large hold- 
ing companies was 
about 98  percent, us. 
about 56percent for 
the rest ofthe sample. 
Second, an interval around each company's 
event date, during which the impact of  the 
event is expected to be discernible had to be 
determined. In this study, daily stock return 
data were used, and abnormal returns over 
the interval beginning 120 trading days before 
and ending 90 trading days after each com- 
pany's event date were generated and exam- 
ined?' This period will be referred to here as 
the examination period. 
Third, one of  a variety of  methods had to 
be used to generate "normal returns"  for each 
company over the examination period. The  first 
step in this process was to estimate a form 
of  the "market model"  equation for each 
company over the 140-day period beginning 
260 trading days before its event date. This 
140-day period is referred to as the estimation 
period. In the market model, the stock returns 
of  a firm in any period are presumed to be a 
linear function of  returns on a broad market 
index and occasionally of  a second factor, the 
returns on an industry index. In this paper, 
the reported results were obtained using a two- 
factor version of  the market m~del.~  Sym- 
bolically, the estimated equations had the fol- 
lowing general form: 
where 
Rjt  =  daily continuously com- 
pounded rate of  return of 
company j, 
Rmt =  daily continuously com- 
pounded rate of  return of 
Standard and Poor's 
500 Index, 
Rbt =  daily continuously com- 
pounded rate of  return of 
OTC Index of  bank stocks, 
ejt =  a stochastic disturbance 
term with standard prop- 
erties, and 
aj, blj, b2j =  regression coefficients to be 
estimated. 
"Normal returns"  for each company over the 
examination period are simply its predicted 
returns obtained using its estimated market 
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model equation and realized returns on each of 
the two stock indicesJ3 
"Abnormal returns"  for each company 
over the examination period were generated 
by subtracting normal returns from realized 
returns. Symbolically, abnormal returns were 
calculated using equation (2) below: 
(2)  aqt = Rjt - RHATjt, 
where 
aqt = "abnormal return"  for the 
j  th  company, 
RHATjt  =  the predicted "normal 
return"  for the jth  company 
obtained using equation (1). 
Because of  the possibility that the returns of 
various companies might be affected by a vari- 
ety of  company-specific developments (aside 
from the specific event of  interest) during the 
examination period, the abnormal returns of 
each company were not analyzed individually. 
Rather, as is typically done in event studies, 
various portfolios of  subject firms were formed 
in event time, and the abnormal returns of 
the companies included in the portfolio were 
averaged cross-sectionally at each point in 
event time over the examination period to 
produce a series of  average abnormal returns 
(AAR). Then this series was cumulated over 
various segments of  event time to produce 
a cumulative average abnormal return meas- 
ure (CAAR) for the particular sample of  compa- 
nies. These steps are represented in equa- 
tion (3) and (4), respectively: 
where 
AARt  =  the average abnormal 
return at event date t, 
J  =  the number of  companies 
in the sample, 
CAARt2,  tl  =  the cumulative average 
abnormal return over the 
t2 - tl  trading day inter- 
val of  event time. 
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the cumulative average return measures indi- 
cate the capital market's estimate of  the market 
value impact of  MBHC consolidation and are 
the focus of  the analysis in this paper. 
If  the event is perceived to have no signifi- 
Table 1  Average and Cumulative 
Average Abnormal Returns 
Entire sample 
Event date  AAR  CAAR  NPa 
AD -  90  -.0019  -.0019 
AD -  85  -.0019  -.0165 
AD -  80  .0067  -.0102 
AD -  75  .0055  .0006 
AD -  70  .0015  -.0066 
AD -  65  -.0043  -.0141 
AD -  60  -.0002  -.0188 
AD -  55  -.0025  -.0237 
AD -  50  .0020  -.0177 
AD - 45  -.0016  -.0194 
AD - 40  -.0007  -.0319 
AD -  35  -.0045  -.0358 
AD -  30  .0013  -.0402 
AD -  25  -.0005  -.0427 
AD -  20  -.0032  -.0500 
AD -  15  -.0055  -.0580 
AD -  14  -.0050  -.0631 
AD -  13  .0045  -.0586 
AD -  12  .0034  -.0551 
AD-  11  .0015  -.0537 
AD - 10  -.0039  -.0576 
AD-9  -.0032  -.0608 
AD-8  -.0036  -.0644 
AD -  7  .0044  -.0600 
AD-6  .0018  -.0582 
AD-5  -.0008  -.0590 
AD-4  -.0017  -.0608 
AD-3  -.0013  -.0621 
AD-2  .0018  -.0602 
AD-1  .0020  -.0582 
AD  -.0002  -.0585 
AD+1  .0034  -.0551 
AD + 10  -.0034  -.0659 
AD + 20  -.0024  -.0645 
AD + 30  .0005  -.0656 
AD  + 40  -.0008  -.0606 
AD + 50  .0041  -.0577 
AD + 60  -.0018  -.0616 
a. Number of  companies with positive residuals. 
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-- 
cant impact on firm value, both the average 
return and cumulative average return measures 
should fluctuate randomly around zero over 
the examination period. If, on the other hand, 
the event is expected to have a beneficial 
impact on future firm profitability and mar- 
ket value, a preponderance of the average 
abnormal returns in the interval prior to the 
announcement date should be positive, caus- 
ing the cumulative average abnormal return 
measure to be positive as well. A run of  neg- 
ative average abnormal returns in this veriod. 

















Average and cumulative average abnormal 
returns for selected trading days over the 
period from 90 trading days before to 60 trad- 
ing days after the announcement date for 
the entire sample and several subsamples are 
presented in tables 1 to 3. The subsamples 
exclude one or more very large money center 
institutions. The rationale for excluding such 
institutions from the analysis is twofold. First, 
virtually all of  their banking assets were con- 
centrated in their lead institution prior to 
consolidation. Thus, consolidation might not 
strongly influence their market valueJ4 Sec- 
ond, two of  these three institutions announced 
their consolidation in 1975, when money ten- 
ter bank stocks were depressed due to the deep 
recession and related large loan losses. 
due either 6  perceptions that the costs bf  con- 
solidation will outweigh the benefits, or pos- 
sibly to some other exogenous factor, will 
cause the cumulative average return meas- 
ure to be negative. 
If markets are efficient, and the  consolidation 
announcement is responsible for the average 
abnormal returns observed, any marked runup 
or decline in the cumulative average return 
measure should cease once the information is 
fully digested by the market. It seems rea- 
sonable to expect that this process should be 
complete by the end of  the day following the 
announcement date. 
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sible that MBHCs 
consolidate to lower 
profit variability, 
rather than raise 
profitability. 
A plot of  the CAAR measure for the entire 
sample over the complete examination period 
appears in figure 1. Plots for the two subsam- 
ples are similar and are not included. CAAR 
measures calculated over various sub-intervals 
of  the examination period and associated test 
Table 2  Average and Cumulative 
Average Abnormal Returns 
Excluding Citicorp 
Event date  AAR  CA  AR  NPa 
AD -  90  -.0025  -.0025  7 
AD -  85  -.0015  -.0142  12 
AD -  80  .0073  -.0075  16 
AD -  75  .0049  -.0006  11 
AD -  70  .0017  -.0057  10 
AD -  65  -.0052  -.0137  7 
AD -  60  .0005  -.0167  9 
AD -  55  -.0031  -.0203  6 
AD -  50  .0018  -.0152  9 
AD -  45  -.0024  -.0171  7 
AD -  40  -.0010  -.0307  11 
AD - 35  -.0041  -.0327  5 
AD -  30  .0009  -.0371  9 
AD -  25  .0012  -.0397  11 
AD -  20  -.0028  -.0446  6 
AD -  15  -.0054  -.0515  3 
AD -  14  -.0045  -.0560  8 
AD -  13  .0042  -.0518  11 
AD -  12  .0030  -.0489  11 
AD-11  .0022  -.0467  10 
AD -  10  -.0035  -.0501  7 
AD-9  -.0038  -.0539  7 
AD-8  -.0024  -.0563  10 
AD -  7  .0050  -.0513  13 
AD -  6  .0021  -.0493  9 
AD -  5  -.0016  -.0508  7 
AD - 4  -.0014  -.0522  12 
AD-3  -.0004  -.0526  9 
AD-2  .0032  -.0495  11 
AD-1  .0033  -.0461  13 
AD  -.0008  -.0470 
AD+1  .0019  -.0451 
AD  + 10  -.0027  -.0584 
AD + 20  -.0012  -.0511 
AD + 30  -.0006  -.0569 
AD  + 40  -.0008  -.0493 
AD  + 50  .0072  -.0424 
AD  + 60  -.0020  -.0514 
a.  Number of  companies with positive residuals. 
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statistics appear in tables 4 to 6. The meth- 
ods used to develop the test statistics are de- 
tailed in the appendi~!~ 
Examination of  the plot and the data in the 
tables reveal that beginning roughly 50 to 60 
trading days prior to the announcement date, 
the CAAR measures turn negative and decline 
more or less steadily until the event date. The 
results are remarkably similar, regardless of 
the sample used. Formal tests indicate that 
the negative cumulative average abnormal 
return measures calculated from AD - 90 to 
AD + 1  are significantly different from zero for 
all three samples (see tables 4 to 6). 
In the post-announcement period, the CAAR 
measures generally fluctuate around the level 
attained on AD + 1, which implies that aver- 
age abnormal returns are essentially random 
during this period. Formal tests confirm that 
the CAAR measures calculated in this time 
period are not significantly different from zero. 
Thus, if  one looks only at the cumulative 
average return measures calculated beginning 
on AD - 90 and ending on AD + 1, the results 
suggest that investors expect consolidation to 
generate negative net benefits. This finding 
raises questions about the motives of  holding 
company management.'5 
However, as noted above, the decision to 
consolidate is a strategic one and could be 
made in response to deteriorating corporate 
performance. This suggests that the impact 
of  consolidation, particularly any positive 
impact, might be evident only for a relatively 
short time immediately around the announce- 
ment date. Accordingly, cumulative average 
abnormal return measures and appropriate 
test statistics were calculated over a variety of 
shorter sub-intervals within the examination 
pe;:de.data  in tables 4 to 6 reveal that negative 
average abnormal returns in the pre-announce- 
ment period were heavily concentrated in 
the period from AD - 45 to AD -  8. CAAR meas- 
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IV. Summary and Conclusions 
Table 3  Average and Cumulative 
Average Abnormal Returns  The results do not provide strong support 
Excluding three large money-center banks  for the contention that subsidiary bank consol- 
cumulative average abnormal returns are 
observed for several time periods beginning 
before and ending just after the announcement 
date. The data indicate that the bulk of  the 
negative average abnormal returns are clus- 
ing days before and ending just prior to the 
announcement date. These results suggest that 
investors expect that the costs of  consolida- 
tion typically outweigh any benefits. 
AD  -  20  -.0037  -.0424  4 
AD  -  15  -.0052  -.0471  3 
AD  -  14  -.0038  -.0509  8 
.0006  AD  - 13  -.0503 
AD  - 12  .0006  -.0497  9 
AD-  11  .0017  -.0480  9 
AD  -  10  -.0027  -.0507  7 
AD  -  9  -.0009  -.0516  7 
AD  -  8  .0026  -.0490  10 
AD  -  7  .0016  -.0474  11 
AD-6  -.0011  -.0485  7 
AD-5  -.0009  -.0494  6 
AD-4  -.0001  -.0494  11 
8  AD  -  3  -.0003  -.0497 
AD-2  .0025  -.0472  10 
AD-  1  .0031  -.0441  12 
AD  -.0004  -.0446  6 
AD+1  .0019  -.0427  11 
AD  + 10  -.0032  -.0532  3 
AD  + 20  -.0020  -.0504  10 
AD  + 30  -.0007  -.0588  7 
AD  + 40  -.0024  -.0516  6 
AD  + 50  .0074  -.0450  8 
AD  + 60  -.0004  -.0501  6 
a. Number of  companies with positive residuals. 
If  this interpretation of  the results is cor- 
rect, it is difficult to explain why holding com- 
pany management pursues such a course of 
action. It may be that partial rather than total 
consolidation is optimal for the typical MBHC. 
The observed preference of  MBHCs for par- 
tial consolidation lends credence to this view. 
Alternatively, MBHC management might 
consolidate to reduce profit variability rather 
than raise profitability.17 At any rate, the evi- 
dence indicates that the inability to consoli- 
date does not impose significant efficiency 
costs on MBHCs. The implication is that leg- 
islation permitting total consolidation is likely 
to generate marginal benefits. 
However, cumulative average abnormal 
returns are positive over very short inter- 
vals immediately around the consolidation 
announcement date and approach statistical 
significance in some cases. In particular, the 
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Best available copy16.  It should be 
noted that total con- 
solidation is not the 
only way to limitsub- 
sidiary risk-taking. 
Selective corporate 
control over certain 
key subsidiary deci- 
sions and access to 
timely subsidiary per- 
formance data would 
also allow the parent 
company to monitor 
and limit the risk- 
taking of subsidiar- 
ies, while retaining 
the MBHC form. 
1Z Most of the 
CAAR measures 
calculated over short 
intervals around the 
announcement date 
are significant at 
the lopercent level, 
ifa  one-tail test is 
used. 
subsample results suggest that consolidation 
is expected to yield greater benefits for smaller 
MBHCs, which makes sense intuitively. Posi- 
tive cumulative average returns following 
negative cumulative returns also suggest that 
consolidation might be the result rather than 
the cause of  poor performance and does gen- 
erate positive expected net benefits, albeit of 
rather modest proportions. 
It should be noted that the failure to find a 
large positive consolidation impact could be 
due to a number of  factors. The sample size is 
rather small. Further, although great care 
was taken in correctly identifying announce- 
ment dates, it is possible that the intention to 
consolidate may have been made public by 
some companies prior to the date used in this 
study. Other contaminating events, such as 
earnings or merger announcements, may have 
influenced the reported results. It is also pos- 
sible that some part of  the holding company 
stock price reaction may have occurred when 
it became apparent that state laws would be 
changed to permit consolidation, rather than 
when the company announced this action. 
Fig. 1  Cumulative Average 
Abnormal Returns  1  CAAR 
-120  -90  -60  -30  0  30  60  90 
Day relative to announcement 
Company returns might also be influenced 
by other provisions of  the enacted legislation 
that affected competitive conditions throughout 
the state. More research on this issue is nec- 
essary before the findings presented here can 
be accepted as definitive. 
Appendix 
The procedure used to calculate the estimated 
standard errors of  the CAAR measures and 
the resultant t-statistics is the same as that 
used in Ruback (1982) and several other event 
studies. The formula used to compute the 
t-statistics is given in equation (Al) below: 
(Al)  t  =  CAARt2,  tl/se (CAARt2,  tl) 
where 
CAARt2,  tl  =  the cumulative aver- 
age abnormal return 
over the t2 - tl  trading 
day interval of  event 
time, and 
se (CAARt2,  tl) =  estimated standard 
error. 
The formula used to calculate this standard 
error is given in equation (A2) below: 
(A2)  se (CAARt2,  t1)  = [Q . var (AAR) 
+ 2(Q - 1) . cov (AAR)]  lI2, 
where 
Q  =  t2-t1+1, 
var(AAR)  =  the variance of  the AARt 
series calculated using 
the following 60 trading 
days: AD -  120 to AD - 91 
and AD + 61 to AD + 90, 
cov(AAR) =  the covariance of  the AARt 
series calculated over the 
same 60 day interval. 
This formulation adjusts the estimated stan- 
dard error for observed autocorrelation in the 
Federal Reserve Bank of  Cleveland 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
Best available copyAARt series, possibly introduced by the clus- 
tering of  events in calendar time. 
Table 4  Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns: All Companies (J  = 21) 
Time period  CAAR  t-statistic 
AD-90t0AD+1  -.0551  -2.27a 
AD-45 toAD+l  -.0373  -2.14a 
AD-45t0AD-8  -.0466  -2.9ga 
AD-45 toAD-3  -.0443  -2.67a 
AD-7t0AD+1  .0093  1.25 
AD-2 toAD+  1  .0070  1.43 
AD-2toAD-1  .0039  1.18 
AD+2  t0AD+60  -.0066  -0.34 
Table 5  Cumulative Average 
Abnormal Returns: All Companies 
Except Citicorp (J  = 20) 
Time period  CAAR  t-statistic 
AD-90 toAD+l  -.0452  -1.98a 
AD-45 toAD+l  -.0304  -1.88a 
AD-45 toAD-8  -.0416  -2.84a 
AD-45 toAD-3  -.0379  -2.43a 
AD-7t0AD+1  .0113  1.57 
AD-2 toAD+l  .0076  1.59 
AD-2toAD-1  .0039  1.95a 
AD+2  t0AD+60  -.0063  -0.34 
Table 6  Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns: All Companies Except Three 
Large, Money-Center Banks (J  = 18) 
Time period  CAAR  t-statistic 
AD-90t0AD+1  -.0427  -1.94a 
AD-45 toAD+l  -.0302  -1.93a 
AD-45 toAD-8  -.0346  -2.48a 
AD-45t0AD-3  -.0347  -2.33a 
AD-7t0AD+1  .0063  0.91 
AD-2 toAD+l  .0070  1.52 
AD-2 toAD-1  .0056  1.72a 
AD+2  t0AD+60  -.0073  -0.42 
a.  Significant at 10 percent level, two-tail test. 
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